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Can The Boat People Assert A Right To Remain
In Asylum?
World political reaction to the Southeast Asian refugee crisis
has not asserted the refugees' human rights under interna-
tional law. As a result most of the refugees lack security from
forcible return to the conditions they fled. They would have
that security if the world powers act instead to implement
non-refoulement, an established moral principle that argua-
bly has attained the status of customary international law.
The summer of 1979 may go down in history as the Summer
of the Boat People1 because of the hundreds of thousands of
Indochinese refugees 2 who fled Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea
1. "Boat People" herein, in accordance with the current popular usage, means refu-
gees leaving Indochina by sea. The seaborne Haitian and Cuban refugees arriving in the
United States also could be termed boat people, but their legal problems are somewhat
different. See text accompanying notes 139-45 infra. The Indochinese exodus has contin-
ued for years on a relatively small scale: as of 1975 about 5,400 persons had left the area
by small boat, and another 2,000 took this route in 1976. Comment, The Dilemma of the
Sea Refugee: Rescue Without Refuge, 18 HAnv. INT'L L.J. 577 n.1 (1977). By contrast, a
refugee assistance organization estimated in July 1979 that the departure rate for May
and June had been 118,000 persons per month, 50% of whom were lost at sea. Press
release by Refugees International, Tokyo (July 1979).
The thousands of refugees who fled overland from Kampuchea into Thailand in the
.fall of 1979 have approximately the same legal status as those who arrived by boat. For
an overview of the causes and effects of that migration, see Deathwatch: Cambodia,
TIME, Nov. 12, 1979, at 42.
2. "Refugees" herein means international political refugees, i.e., persons forced to
leave or stay away from their state of nationality because of political events making their
continuance there impossible, and who have taken refuge in another state without
acquiring a new nationality. See S. SINHA, ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-105
(1971). This discussion does not apply to economic refugees except insofar as their eco-
nomic deprivation is politically motivated. See note 144 infra (poverty in Haiti as
persecution).
The situation of the Indochinese refugees is complicated by economic scarcity. As a
result of years of warfare, all three of the Indochinese states have little food to go
around. In some parts of Kampuchea the scarcity amounts to famine, and it is reasona-
ble to say that the majority of the ethnic Kampuchean refugees left because of this eco-
nomic deprivation. See Deathwatch: Cambodia, supra note 1. The need for asylum, how-
ever, is predicated on the repressive measures awaiting the refugees on their return, not
on the factors that motivated their leaving. In regard to the Kampuchean refugees, there
is evidence that they face persecution on their return simply because they left, even
though they left for nonpolitical reasons. See note 19 infra.
The motivation of the ethnic Chinese Boat People can be characterized in a sense as
economic. Chinese in Vietnam largely follow mercantile occupations, and a merchant
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in leaky, overcrowded boats, desperately seeking temporary asy-lum3 from politically and ethnically motivated persecution 4 in
their native lands. For most, the long sea voyage was a terrifying
ordeal, and many thousands did not survive it.5 Even for those
class has no place in a socialist society. Interview with Ann Fagan Ginger, visiting profes-
sor, University of Puget Sound Law School, in Tacoma (Oct. 28, 1980). There is evi-
dence, however, that the repression they fled, although in part economically imple-
mented, has also been directed against them as a people and implemented through social
persecution. See note 19 infra.
No disinterested tribunal has determined the exact nature of the repressive mea-
sures that impelled the Boat People to risk their lives at sea or the certainty that those
measures still await them. The notorious events of the past 21/2 years, however, raise a
reasonable question regarding their safety if they return home.
3. "Asylum" may mean a place or territory where one is not subject to seizure by
one's pursuers, or it may mean protection or freedom from such seizure. The latter sense
is the usual meaning in international law. II A. GRAthtL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw § 161 (1972). When a state has difficulty granting asylum, as in
the case of a mass influx, it may admit persons only temporarily and then, when a
chance arises for resettlement elsewhere, advise them to leave its territory or expel them
if necessary. Id. § 223. The United Nations codified such provisional or temporary asy-
lum in the GAOR Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 14 December 1967, art. 3, § 3,
G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 81, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1967).
4. "Persecution" is an imprecise term of art in United Nations treatment of refu-
gees. The distinction between persecution and mere discrimination is an evidentiary one
and difficult to draw without bias. See text accompanying notes 142-48 infra. The more
liberal school of commentators holds that any measure "in disregard of human dignity"
may be persecution. Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, U.N. Doc.
HCR/INF/49, at 22 (1961). See also J. VERNANT, THE REFUGEE IN THE POsT-WAR WORLD
8 (1953). The more restrictive school limits the term to deprivation of life or physical
freedom, including protracted forced unemployment. K. ZINK, DAs AsYLREcHT IN DEE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND NACH DIM ABKOMMEN VOM 28. JuLi 1951 0BER Dm
RECHTSSTELLUNG DEE FLOCHTLINGE UNTER BESoNDERER BEROCKSICHTIGUNG DER RECwTs-
SPRECHUNG DEE VERWALTUNGSGEcwm 74 (1962), paraphrased in I A. GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 3, § 82. For United States judicial interpretations consistent with the restric-
tive school, see Dunat v. Hurney, 297 F.2d 744, 746 (3d Cir. 1961) ("The denial of an
opportunity to earn a livelihood ... is the equivalent of a sentence to death by means of
slow starvation . . . .") and Blazina v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507, 509 & n.2 (3d Cir. 1961)
(public scorn and denial of government employment insufficient to constitute "physical
persecution" on religious grounds). See note 19 infra. See generally I A. GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 3, §§ 80-87.
5. Many boats, unfit for a sea voyage, foundered in the international waters of the
South China Sea. Refugee aid workers estimate that at the height of the exodus, up to
70% of the boats did not finish the trip. Lewis, A Crime Against Humanity, N.Y. Times,
June 14, 1979, § A, at 29, col. 1; U.S. to Double Its Refugee Quota to 14,000 a Month,
id., June 29, 1979, at 1, col. 3. Many drownings occurred because commercial ships in the
zone ignored vessels in distress. U.S. Is Collecting Refugee Reports on Mistreatment by
Malaysia's Navy, id., July 26, 1979, at 6, col. 3. The settled rule of maritime law is that
the master of a ship is duty bound to rescue anyone in danger of being lost at sea. Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage at
Sea, signed Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, T.S. No. 576. Traditionally, however, no sover-
eign state has the duty to take in unwanted aliens arriving by vessel, and thus freighters
in the South China Sea could have become permanent caretakers of hundreds of desti-
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lucky enough to reach other shores and receive permission to
land,6 the terror may not be over. Because they are present at
the sufferance of the governments that admitted them, the great
majority7 of the Boat People cannot rely on due process of law
to prevent arbitrary repatriation' if those governments change
tute "passengers." The likelihood of prosecution is remote for the master who declines to
take on that burden. One writer recommends reimbursement of shipowners and an inter-
national convention compelling temporary asylum as solutions to the freighters'
dilemma. Comment, supra note 1, at 577-78, 601-04.
6. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines have
provided shelter in temporary camps for about 500,000 refugees. Alexander, Refugees
International: determined to do something, Tokyo Weekender, July 5, 1979, at 4, col. 1.
In June 1979, however, Malaysia began pushing off boats that had made it to the beach
and forcing refugees to reembark if they jumped off into the shallow water. The alterna-
tive for the passengers was to return home or travel hundreds of miles farther to Indone-
sia. (Singapore, directly south of Malaysia, closed its borders early and has refused to
accept more Boat People.) Interview with Michael J. Morrissey, Director of Refugees
International, in Tokyo (July 12, 1979); N.Y. Times, July 3, 1979, at 3, col. 2.
Savage pirate attacks, sometimes hitting the same boat several times, began in Thai-
land's coastal waters in late summer of 1979. Refugee workers suspected that the attacks
were condoned and perhaps organized by local Thai authorities. Interview with Michael
J. Morrissey, supra. Pirate attacks have continued against the relatively small number of
refugee boats still essaying the trip. Thai Piracy Against Boat People Seems Relentless,
N.Y. Times, May 7, 1980, § A, at 6, col. 1.
7. The greater part of the Boat People now in temporary asylum, some 300,000, are
encamped in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and the Philippines. These five
states have asserted the right to return all refugees to their states of origin, including
those already in transit camps being processed for permanent asylum in other countries.
5 Asian Nations Bar Any More Refugees, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
Another 240,000 Boat People of Chinese ethnicity have found shelter in the People's
Republic of China. Although they too are housed in temporary camps, they can claim the
prerogatives of citizenship because Chinese law and policy since 1909 have followed the
doctrine of jus sanguinis: anyone of Chinese extraction in the paternal line, though sev-
eral generations removed from the homeland, has Chinese citizenship unless he repudi-
ates it. 1 J. COHEN & H. CHIu, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW § 23 (1974).
8. Expatriation in law is the voluntary act of abandoning one's country and becom-
ing the citizen or subject of another. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979). Repa-
triation is its negation, the "regaining (of] nationality" after expatriation. Id. at 1167.
Repatriation need not be voluntary, and this comment discusses the situations where it
is not. Customarily, physically crossing a border does not force the other country to rec-
ognize the newcomer as a subject, although he is de facto subject to that country's police
power. See id. at 1277-78; notes 97-99 infra. Likewise, crossing back does not force the
original country to restore the newcomer's nationality; he may become what is known as
a stateless person, i.e., one without a nationality. Nevertheless he is repatriated in the
sense that he is again subject to his country's police power. See Weis, The International
Protection of Refugees, 48 Am. J. ITr'L L. 193, 196 (1954) (forcible repatriation).
Pushing refugee boats back out to sea arguably is not repatriation because the boats
need not return to their original port. See Comment, supra note 1, at 590, 594. On the
other hand, when the passengers are at the end of their resources and the next possible
asylum state is hundreds of nautical miles away, return may be the only reasonable alter-
native to death at sea. When the return trip too is hundreds of miles, the practical result
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their attitude. This is so because due process,' despite advances
in worldwide recognition of human rights,10 is still a concomitant
of citizenship or of recognized alien status.1 A lag in the devel-
opment of international law and custom allows some accepting
states to deny refugees alien status even while granting them
temporary asylum; in those countries, which include the United
States of America, the Boat People can be present in body but
not "present" at municipal law.' Their permission to remain
is that there is no alternative.
9. The term "due process" is seldom used in international law, perhaps because its
meaning varies considerably from one state to another. In the narrow sense, due process
requires only that government action against the individual proceed in a legally sanc-
tioned manner. In the broader sense, as used herein, due process requires that the indi-
vidual have notice and a fair hearing before being deprived of legal rights or privileges.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 449 (5th ed. 1979). "Fair" is a relative term and can con-
note more procedural safeguards in a country like the United States, where due process
has been extensively litigated, than in other countries. For discussion and cases on the
development of procedural due process in the United States, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONSTrruTIoNAL LAw 459-501 (10th ed. 1980).
Irrespective of what may constitute a fair hearing, this comment takes the position
that mass repatriation with no hearing is lack of due process as the term is used in the
principal international instrument on refugee rights:
[Elxpulsion. . .shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance
with due process of law. . . . [T]he refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence
to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before
competent authority or a person or persons specially designated by the compe-
tent authority.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, art. 32, § 219, U.S.T.
6223, 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577,606 U.N.T.S. 267.
10. Oppenheim defines human rights as "the right of existence, the right to protec-
tion of honour, life, health, liberty, and property, the right of practising the religion of
...choice, the right of emigration, and the like." I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §
292 (3d ed. 1920) ("rights of mankind"). The 30 articles of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 10 December 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948) [here-
inafter cited as Universal Declaration], reprinted in BASIC DocuMENTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 106 (I. Brownlie ed. 1971), embody the current international understanding of
fundamental human rights. See also L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PRO-
TECTION OF HUMAN RIoHTS 1-8 (1973).
11. An alien is a natural or legal person who, in respect to a particular political
society, is not a member. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
2-17 (1968). Aliens often receive different treatment according to their mode of entry
into the particular society. Permanent resident aliens, those who have declared their
intention to immigrate, usually have the broadest protection under the laws. In constitu-
tional states they enjoy most of the rights granted under the constitution. Nonimmigrant
aliens, temporarily in the country to visit or attend school, are next in status. Both types
of alien have recognized status because their admission is through regular governmental
procedures. Unrecognized aliens are those who have made surreptitious entry or have
been denied legal entry; they have the least protection. See Comment, Extending the
Constitution to Refugee-Parolees, 15 SAN DIEGO L. Rxv. 139, 142-49 (1977).
12. Municipal law is that which derives from custom grown up within the bounda-
ries of the state concerned and from statutes enacted by the lawgiving authority. I L.
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derives only from administrative or legislative conferral; and
permission that is specially conferred can be easily revoked.1 3
In contrast to municipal law, international law14 recognizes
human rights that exist independent of alienage. These rights
are embodied in the International Bill of Rights, a series of doc-
uments that the United Nations inaugurated in 194815 to define
and protect fundamental human freedoms. At first broadly
worded and put forth as a "common standard of achievement,"' e
this body of law through subsequent citation and expatiation
has pervaded world politics with amazing speed.17 International
human rights law forbids any state forcibly to repatriate politi-
cal refugees to a state of origin where persecution awaits them."8
Documented severe discrimination, amounting to outright perse-
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 20 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
13. In contrast, constitutional rights accompanying recognized legal status are irrev-
ocable. Legal status therefore confers on the alien a security that a legislature, however
humanitarian its motives, cannot be held accountable for. The majority of national gov-
ernments are, at least in theory, constitutional. WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER,
LAW AND JUDICIAL SYSTEMS OF NATIONS passim (3d rev. ed. 1978).
14. International law derives from custom grown up within the community of
nations and from lawmaking treaties concluded by the members of that community.
Adherence to international law is by consent, which may be (a) express, by treaty, or (b)
tacit, by adopting the custom of submitting to certain rules of international conduct. I L.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, §§ 16, 20.
15. ILA Committee on Human Rights, Ratification Now, HUMAN RIGHTS, summer
1978, at 38.
16. Universal Declaration, preamble, supra note 10, at 145. Typical of the docu-
ment's generality is the article on asylum, which states merely that "everyone has the
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." Id. art. 14, § 1.
Subsequent instruments such as the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, done
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 10, at 135, and the Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 14 December 1967,
supra note 3, flesh out the meaning of asylum. See, e.g., notes 3 supra & 18, 70, 71 infra.
17. Nearly all other bodies of international law are of ancient lineage. Maritime law
and the law of warfare, for instance, go back almost to the beginning of recorded history.
I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, 88 39-41. The accelerated development of international
human rights law owes much to the disastrous global wars and civil wars of this century.
Id. § 340k.
18. "No [political refugee] shall be subject to measures such as rejection at the fron-
tier or, if he has already entered the territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or
compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected to persecution." United
Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 14 December 1967, supra note 3, art. 3, § 1.
"No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatso-
ever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion." Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, art.
33, § 1, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6276, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, done July 28, 1951, art. 33, § 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 176, supra
note 16.
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cution,1 was the cause of the Boat People's exodus and presum-
ably awaits them if they return. Nevertheless they remain in
danger of repatriation because of lags or inconsistencies in the
application of international human rights law.
Inconsistencies are the common signs of a clash between old
and new concepts in the law. 0 Human rights, a new concept in
19. Evidence exists of repression that meets even the restrictive standard for perse-
cution. See note 4 supra; Indochinese Refugees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Asian & Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 58
(1979) (State Dep't traces the problem to Vietnamese policies in all three countries)
[hereinafter cited as Indochinese Refugees]. Vietnamese officials acknowledged that
their objective was to expel the ethnic Chinese population as quickly as possible. To this
end, the government subjected the Chinese to harassment including loss of jobs, closure
of schools, curfews, police intimidation, and detention in concentration camps or reset-
tlement zones. Hanoi Regime Reported Resolved to Oust Nearly All Ethnic Chinese,
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1979, at 1, col. 1. Doong Lap Nhon, an escapee of one of the reset-
tlement zones, known as "new economic zones," described it as a remote forest without
houses or food. Id., Aug. 5, 1979, at 3, col. 2.
Non-Chinese in Vietnam have also been subjected to loss of freedom on the basis of
profession, politics, and religion. South Vietnamese physicians, lawyers, low-level
employees of the previous government, and members of minority religious groups have
been confined for up to three years in "collective re-education camps," described by
Western experts as similar to penal colonies. Comment, supra note 1, at 585; N.Y.
Times, supra, at 6, col. 4.
Refugees from Kampuchea and Laos suffer from the effects of a number of
problems, including open warfare and starvation. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTCES FOR 1979 463-66, 482-87 (Joint Comm. Print 1980). Never-
theless there is clear evidence of political repression directed against the safety and even
the lives of civilian noncombatants in those countries. Two warring governments control
Kampuchea: the embattled Pol Pot regime in a small part of the west, and a new govern-
ment controlled by Vietnam in the rest of the country. Refugees have declared their fear
of both sides. Pol Pot's soldiers, they have stated, would shoot them as traitors for leav-
ing the country. Thais Deport 30,000 Cambodians While Others Continue to Arrive,
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1. Apparently in confirmation of this predic-
tion, gunfire could be heard as Thai troops forced thousands of defenseless Kampuchean
refugees back across the border in June of 1979. At Thai Camp, an Exile's Joy Turns to
Grief, id., June 14, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 3. On the other hand, the majority of the 50,000
refugees forcibly returned by Thailand in June of 1979 were ethnic Chinese. If they
escaped being shot by Pol Pot's forces, they faced the same kind of harassment in the
Vietnamese zone as the ethnic Chinese were suffering in Vietnam itself. N.Y. Times,
June 12, 1979, supra.
The bulk of Laotian refugees are members of the Hmong (Meo) tribe, a minority
that fought for the French and Americans and continued its resistance to the communist
government after the Americans left. To say that the refugee combatants are fleeing per-
secution is probably not justifiable. U.S. D'EPT OF STATE, supra, at 485-86. However, per-
sistent reports of indiscriminate use of poison gas by Laotian and Vietnamese troops
against the civilian Hmong population, between 1974 and 1979, lend support to refugees'
assertions that this deadly form of persecution awaits them if they return. Colbert,
Poison Gas Use in Indochina, DEP'T OF STATE BULL., March 1980, at 43.
20. The history of law abounds with instances. An example is the different set of
rules governing defamation, depending on whether it is libel (written) or slander (spo-
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international law,21 has gained its place in conflict with the time-
honored tradition of the state's supremacy within its own bor-
ders;22 thus it is no surprise that international human rights law
is not yet thoroughgoing. One conspicuous discrepancy, men-
tioned above, is the state's continuing license to tie legal rights
to its definition of "presence." In addition, the maxim that "for
every right there must be a remedy" does not yet apply here:
international law enumerates rights of individuals but no reme-
dies for individuals. Any suit by an individual in an interna-
tional forum would clash with the ancient but persistent princi-
ple that only sovereigns have international standing."3 Thus,
ken). L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 12, at 80 (1978) ("Certainly the English
judges who created the separate torts of slander and libel never dreamed of what 20th
century science would create in new forms and methods for recording and transmitting
the thoughts and words of man."). Another example is the preservation of distinct law
and equity procedures in courts with full power to do both in the same case. D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.6, at 84 (1973) ("[T]here are courts that view
the chancellor and the judge as vastly different creatures, even where they share the
same body."). A third example is the elaboration of the unseaworthiness doctrine in
United States admiralty law far beyond its original relation to the ship's operation. G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-38, at 383 (2d ed. 1975) ("The Jones
Act count and the unseaworthiness count overlap completely: they derive from the same
accident and look toward the same remedy. As a matter of jurisprudential elegance or
even of common sense it would have been desirable . . . to abandon the cumbersome
fiction that two causes of action are involved.").
On the international level, a prime example is the ability of all states to deal directly
with slaves, pirates, and genocidal criminals as individuals in the face of the general rule
that only states can be subjects of international law. J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-72 (8th ed. 1977). See also H. KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW 76
(1944).
21. "When, a hundred years from now, the International Law Association celebrates
its bicentenary, legal historians will surely be saying that one of the chief characteristics
of midtwentieth century international law was its sudden interest in and concern with
human rights." R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY 1 (1979).
22. Under current international law, a state has discretion where specific conven-
tions are not in force, to determine the reasonable relation between physical and legal
presence and to set a reasonable time limit for detention. Some states' practices strain
reason. See text accompanying notes 104-18 infra.
23. "Such individuals as do not possess any nationality enjoy . .. no protection
whatever, and if they are aggrieved by a State they have no means of redress .... " I L.
OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 291 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). "Only States may
be parties in cases before the Court." Statute of the International Court of Justice,
opened for signature June 26, 1945, art. 34, § 1, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter
cited as Statute of the ICJ]. Despite the statute's phrasing, the court [hereinafter the
ICJ] in an advisory opinion has declared that the United Nations itself is an interna-
tional person with capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims. Advi-
sory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
[1949] I.C.J. 174. This opinion leaves the door open for possible representation of refu-
gees by an international organization, which has not yet occurred. See text accompany-
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absent arguments for modifying the standing requirement, the
Boat People must somehow convince their sovereign states to
plead their case as if the states themselves were the aggrieved
parties. This is unlikely ever to happen because the Boat Peo-
ple's sovereign states caused their troubles in the first place.
This comment assesses legal arguments that might help the
Boat People find and assert a right to remain in asylum.2 4 The
focus is on Indochinese refugees because they are one of the
greatest masses of displaced persons today.2 5 Although their
emigration has slackened and the recent arrivals of Haitians and
Cubans have eclipsed the coverage of them in the United States
media,'2  hundreds of thousands of Boat People remain in limbo
with no reasonable hope of permanent resettlement.2 7 Further-
more, few Boat People can take advantage of international
agreements; the states where the bulk of them sojourn have not
ratified any of the international protocols or conventions on ref-
ugee rights.2 8 Thus, the Boat People must rely on international
law in its most general form, and any legal argument available to
ing notes 154-59 infra.
24. The comment is necessarily limited to one of the many problems the Boat Peo-
ple face. Cf., e.g., Comment, supra note 1 (death at sea); N.Y. Times, May 30, 1979, at
14, col. 2 (brutal conditions in camps); TnaM, supra note 1 (starvation and refusal of
initial admission at the frontier).
25. Their numbers are exceeded by the 1.7 million political refugees in the Horn of
Africa, where disease and malnutrition are rampant in relief camps. A Harvest of
Despair, TiME, June 30, 1980, at 34. Of those displaced, however, 1.1 million are not
international refugees and are thus unaffected by the entry doctrine: although displaced
from their own provinces, they have not crossed an international boundary. See Wren,
Million Ogaden Refugees Clinging to Life in Somalia, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1980, at 6,
col. 3. For a discussion of the boundary crossing requirement in the international recog-
nition of refugees, see Plender, Admission of Refugees: Draft Convention on Territorial
Asylum, 15 SAN DIGO L. Ray. 45 (1977).
26. E.g., Refugee Policy Draws Fire in Hearing, Washington Post, May 13, 1980, §
A, at 6, col. 1; Cuba Will Ignore U.S. Effort to Halt Refugee Boatlift, id., May 16, 1980,
§ A, at 1, col. 5; Destitute Haitian Refugees Threaten to Swamp Bahamas, id., § A, at
32, col. 1.
27. There is little likelihood that the governments expelling the refugees will change
their policies or lose power to more tolerant political systems in the near future. Com-
ment, supra note 11, at 149 n.102. The United States, far in the lead of those countries
offering secondary asylum (378,000 in five years), allows no more than 5,100 refugees per
year, from all sources, to achieve legal alien status. 125 CONG. REC. H12,394 (daily ed.
Dec. 20, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Collins).
28. See note 7 supra. These five states are all members of the United Nations and
as such have implicitly assented to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a reso-
lution of the General Assembly. Declarations of the General Assembly, however, are in
the nature of recommendations and are not legally binding as international agreements. I
A. GRAHL-MAnsm', supra note 3, § 25. The legal force of the Universal Declaration has a
different source; see text accompanying notes 61-69 infra.
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them is available to any refugee from persecution.29 To develop,
those arguments, this comment first examines the evidence that
international human rights, through a generation of usage and
interpretation, have become customary laws0 that applies
throughout the world. Second, the comment extrapolates from
existing legal doctrine to find grounds for greater consistency in
international human rights and correspondingly greater restric-
tion on a state's power to deal with refugees arbitrarily. Finally,
it looks at developments in the international law of standing
whereby the Boat People may be able to gain representation for
enforcement of their rights. If these arguments have any persua-
siveness, not only the Boat People but also any other political
refugees and future refugees may benefit.
REFUGEEHOOD: ITS PAST AND FUTURE
Arguments for a legal solution to the refugee problem gain
added force from the emerging realization that the problem is
not a temporary one.31 The Boat People cannot safely go home
in the foreseeable future, nor are they likely to find any state
that will give them citizenship en masse. They are permanent
refugees, and they are by no means the only group of refugees in
that plight.3 The situation of today's refugees thereby differs
29. Refugees for other causes, such as strictly economic suffering, natural disaster,
or threat of prosecution for nonpolitical crime, are the concern of somewhat different
areas of international law. I A. GRAHL-MADszN, supra note 3, §§ 34-35; see note 2 supra.
30. Customary international law is habitual behavior, by organs of states and other
subjects of international law, that evidences a general practice accepted as law. The prac-
tice must be prevalent at least within a certain region or group of international persons. I
A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 26(i). The Statute of the ICJ specifies custom as one
of the legal principles to be applied in the court's decision:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations;
(d) . .. judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
Id., art. 38, § 1, supra note 23, at 276 (emphasis added). The order of listing of sources of
law in article 38, § 1, is also generally the order of weight given those sources by the ICJ.
J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 62.
31. See Weis, supra note 8, at 220 (evaluation of problem as temporary consistently
disproved by historical events).
32. The most notable example is the Palestinians, many of whom have been refu-
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from that of the millions made homeless or stateless"3 by the two
world wars, most of whom found homes once the fighting
stopped. Observers in that era felt that, short of another global
war, the number of refugees would dwindle to an easily manage-
able size.3" Accordingly, voluntary solutions were the predomi-
nant mode of dealing with the problem.
The first concerted international effort to deal with
refugeehood, by the League of Nations in 1921, was in this vol-
untary mode. Nearly a million persons had fled the civil war in
Russia. The League appointed a High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, whose function was to allocate the refugees among those
countries willing to take them in, to find work for them, and to
undertake relief work among them with the aid of philanthropic
societies.3 3 The commissioner did not have a mandate to assist
all political refugees," so as new upheavals produced new expa-
triates the League extended the mandate by piecemeal resolu-
tions: to the Armenians in 1924,11 to the Assyrians, Assyro-
Chaldeans, and Turks in 1928, 8 to residents of the Saar in
1935,'0 and to Austrians and Sudetenlanders in 1938.40 The cur-
rent refugee assistance agency, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),' 1 has a broad man-
gees since 1948. On the origin of that problem, see Radley, The Palestinian Refugees:
The Right to Return in International Law, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 586 (1978).
33. A stateless person may be a refugee, but no necessary correlation between the
two statuses exists. International law treats them separately. Thus the Convention Relat-
ing to the Status of Stateless Persons, done Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, reprinted
in BASIc DocuMENTs ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 153, confers on the stateless,
i.e., those "not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law,"
rights similar to those accorded refugees under the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, supra note 16. I A. GRAHL-MADSEN,
supra note 3, § 36(iv).
34. However reasonable that may have been at the time, the postwar takeover of
many countries by communist governments precluded the foreseeable return of large
blocs of refugees and persons who, though absent from their homelands for other rea-
sons, became refugees through the change in government. See I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra
note 3, §§ 36(iv), 148.
35. S. SINHA, supra note 2, at 126.
36. Weis, supra note 8, at 194.
37. Plan for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees, 5 LEAGUE
OF NATIONS O.J. 969 (1924).
38. Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of Cer-
tain Measures Taken in Favor of Russian and Armenian Refugees, done June 30, 1928,
89 L.N.T.S. 63.
39. Refugees from the Saar, art. 2, 16 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 634 (1935).
40. Draft Protocol, Refugees Coming from the Territory Which Formerly Consti-
tuted Austria, 19 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 647 (1938).
41. The agency was created under the Statute of the Office of the United Nations
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date but still essentially depends on voluntary relief measures.
The statute of the office describes the commissioner's functions
in such phrases as "[p]romoting. . .international conventions,"
"[aissisting governmental and private efforts to promote volun-
tary repatriation or assimilation," and "[e]ndeavouring to obtain
permission for refugees to transfer their assets." ' Promoting,
assisting, and endeavoring, where the results must depend on
charity, are no substitutes for enforcement of legal rights.48
Charity, however, when extended on principle can become
custom; and custom under some circumstances can become
international law." Paul Weis, legal advisor to the Office of the
UNHCR, noted in 1954 that the refugee resettlement agree-
ments of that and other international agencies customarily con-
tained restrictions on expulsion,4' and postulated the growth of
that custom into a duty. While admitting that states classically
had full discretion to exclude aliens, he considered that discre-
tion to be no longer absolute:
It is believed, however, that a rule of international law is in the
process of development, which qualifies this right in the sense
that states should not refuse admission to a bona fide refugee
where such a refusal would expose him to persecution endan-
gering his life or freedom, i.e., primarily at the frontiers of his
country of origin. This does not imply that the admitting state
should necessarily permit the continued residence of the refu-
gee once admitted. The admitting state may, subject to its
treaty obligations, and sometimes does, expel him to another
country."
High Commissioner for Refugees [hereinafter Statute of the UNHCR], G.A. Res. 428
(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), and began operation
Jan. 1, 1951. Preceding it were three postwar agencies with the same general function:
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 1943-1947; Prepar-
atory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO), 1947-1948; and
International Refugee Organization (IRO), 1948-1950. S. SINHA, supra note 2, at 127.
42. Statute of the UNHCR, supra note 41, ch. II, para. 8.
43. With the authorization of the General Assembly, it is possible for the UNHCR
to secure an advisory opinion on legal rights from the International Court of Justice.
Weis, supra note 8, at 219 n.68; text accompanying notes 154-59 infra. Ensuing enforce-
ment would be through the force of world opinion. See text accompanying notes 162-63
infra.
44. See text accompanying notes 53-69 infra. See generally I L. OPPENHEIM, supra
note 12, § 17; S. SINHA, supra note 2, at 5-35; J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 40-47; see also
H. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CusToMARY LAw AND CODIFICATION (1972).
45. Weis, supra note 8, at 197-98.
46. Id. at 199.
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Ten years later Weis stated his rule more emphatically: "There
seems to be general acceptance of the principle of the non-
return of refugees to a country of persecution. 4 7 On hindsight,
we need only compare these words with more recent headlines'8
to conclude that Weis was premature. This does not mean he
was wrong. Many commentators agree that the rule is in the"process of development" and disagree only on its pace.4 Most
would still call it a prediction of the future. A special case of
Weis's rule, however, is probably already universal law: the pro-
vision in the International Bill of Rights that forbids repatria-
tion (refoulement) once asylum is granted.50 Those Boat People
who are already in temporary asylum (i.e., the great majority 1)
should be able to invoke that provision as security against return
if not against transfer.52
47. Weis, Appendix I, Legal Aspects of the Problem of Asylum, REP. OF 51sT CONF.
283, 292-93 (Int'l L. Ass'n 1965).
48. E.g., Malaysia to Put 70,000 Refugees Back Out to Sea; Says Vietnamese Try-
ing to Land Will Be Shot, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1979, at 1, col. 2; 5 Asian Nations.
Reserve Right to Enforce Repatriation, id., July 1, 1979, at 1, col. 5.
49. The drafters phrased the Declaration as a "standard for achievement" rather
than a set of immediate obligations. The wording gave rise to conflicting interpretations
of publicists as to whether the Declaration was enforceable. Three schools of opinion
formed shortly after its publication. One, the naturalist school, held that the Declaration
neither imposed obligations on states nor conferred specific rights on individuals. Manley
0. Hudson, chief exponent of this school, wrote that the human rights clauses of the
United Nations Charter (which the Declaration expands upon) were limited to "setting
out a program of action" and did not represent international law at that stage of its
development. Hudson, Integrity of International Instruments, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 107
(1948). Another school, the positivists, considered the Declaration immediately and fully
enforceable. Hersh Lauterpacht, chief representative of this view, found a "distinct ele-
ment of legal duty" attaching to the Declaration through article 56 of the United
Nations Charter, wherein all members pledged themselves to joint and separate action.
H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147-49 (1950). A third school,
the evolutionary, found no immediate obligations but pointed out the existence of
"latent possibilities" for growth. J. ROBINSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREE-
DOMS IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. A COMMENTARY 105 (1946), quoted in
Schwelb, The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the
Charter, 66 Am. J. INT'L L. 337, 341 (1972). Subsequent practice has tended to bear out
the opinions of the latter two schools. See text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
50. See note 18 supra.
51. Most of those not now in temporary asylum are dead. See notes 5 & 6 supra.
52. Those turned back initially at the border do not achieve expatriation and thus
are not covered by the repatriation provision. II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, §
178(i). In humanitarian terms and in terms of fundamental human rights, it is absurd to
distinguish between refugees who step a few feet across an imaginary line and those who
are stopped a few feet short. Their needs are the same. The distinction is a creature of
the conflict between human rights law and the state sovereignty principle. A state that
lets refugees cross its borders is performing an act of sovereignty that creates hitherto
nonexistent obligations. The sovereignty principle, though waning in importance, still
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SOURCES OF AUTHORITY IN REFUGEE LAW
No court in the world has yet grounded a decision on Weis's
rule;53 similarly, no state that did not sign the international cov-
enant prohibiting repatriation has been held liable for it. This
lack of explicit authority is not fatal to the rule, which exists, if
at all, as customary international law. Customary law grows in a
complex interaction between pronouncement and practice," and
often the articulation of a rule does not occur until after its gen-
eral adoption. Ultimately, however, the rule must have its source
in the black letter of treaties or other international instru-
ments.5 5 Initially the terms of such documents bind only the
states that sign them, but if such a term becomes the basis of a
worldwide practice, it can bind" states that never explicitly
agreed to it.
The black letter of refugee rights begins in the United
Nations Charter, wherein the member states pledge themselves
to act for universal observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms." Every state joining the United Nations, upon admis-
has the power to weigh in the balance against newer rules. See notes 20 & 23 supra. See
also S. SINHA, supra note 2, at 108-11.
53. II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 181. Austria, Belgium, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland confer a right to be
granted asylum under municipal law, but according to Grahl-Madsen these measures are
not evidence of international custom because the motivation was humanitarian, not legal.
Id. § 182.
54. Weis, supra note 8, at 221.
55. Practice constitutes the custom, and the black letter constitutes acceptance of
the custom. Both elements must normally be present before the custom can become law.
See H. THIRLWAY, supra note 44, at 46-60. There are occasional exceptions to the black
letter requirement, as in a right-of-way dispute between Portugal and India that came
before the ICJ. The occurrence of a "constant and uniform practice" of passage over the
disputed zone for 125 years satisfied the court that the parties had accepted the practice
as law and that it gave rise to a right and a correlative obligation. Right of Passage over
Indian Territory (Merits), [1960] I.C.J. 6, 40.
56. Lacking overall political authority, international law never binds absolutely. No
state can be compelled to abide by customary law it chooses to ignore. Cf. Weis, supra
note 8, at 195 ("Universality and enforcement are two moot points of international
law."). A decision of the ICJ affirming customary law has its chief legal force through its
effect on conscience and through the justification it provides for diplomatic sanctions or
even self-help against the offending state. Only 43 of the 153 United Nations member
states have submitted to ICJ jurisdiction, most of them with major reservations. Court of
Lost Resort, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 24, 1979, at 83. The ICJ's advisory opinions, however,
carry persuasive authority that can focus international policy and action. See note 67
infra.
57. "[T]he United Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 55. "All Members pledge themselves to take
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sion, adheres to that charter as a multilateral treaty.'8 The char-
ter itself does not define such rights and freedoms, but the
United Nations issued an authoritative guide to their content"
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 0 of 1948.
Intended as the first in a series of documents called the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights," the Universal Declaration is basic to the
others and carries the widest influence. It enumerates rights of
well-being,' nondiscrimination," equal protection, and fair
hearing, 8 all of which apply to the Boat People's situation, as
rights of all human beings irrespective of their citizenship or res-
joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56. See W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CASES AND MATERIALS 62-68 (2d ed. 1962).
58. "All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting
from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accor-
dance with the present Charter." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, § 2. "Membership in the United
Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in
the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to
carry out these obligations." Id. art. 4, § 1.
59. I. BROwNLI, P mcujLzs op PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (2d ed. 1973). The
vote in the General Assembly to adopt the Universal Declaration was 48 states in favor,
none opposing, and eight abstaining. BASIc DocuMENTS ON HUMA RIGHTS, supra note
10, at 106. When the General Assembly adopts such a resolution concerned with general
norms of international law, the majority vote is evidence of authoritativeness because it
represents the opinions of governments expressed "in the widest forum for the expres-
sion of such opinions." I. BROWNLm, supra, at 14.
60. Supra note 10. The preamble of the Universal Declaration relates it specifically
to the obligations of articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter: "Whereas Mem-
ber States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations,
the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms .... " Id. preamble, para. 6.
61. Besides the Universal Declaration, the Bill comprises three other documents: the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316,
reprinted in BAsiC DocuMiENTs ON HumAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 199; the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, id., Supp. (No. 16) 52, at 211; and the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, id., Supp.
(No. 16) 59, at 232. Kindt, A Historical Analysis of International Documents Relating
to the Status of Women and Their Relationship to the Future Foreign Policy of the
United States, 2 U. PuGEr SD. L. Rzv. 221, 230 (1979).
62. "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services. .. ." Universal Declaration, art. 25, § 1, supra note 10, at 111.
63. "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind .... " Id. art. 2, at 108.
64. "All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
equal protection of the law." Id. art. 7. See note 95 infra.
65. "Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an indepen-
dent and impartial tribunal. . . ." Universal Declaration, art. 10, supra note 10, at 108-
09. See note 9 supra.
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idence. The document states these rights as broad goals rather
than binding law. Nevertheless, in the past generation the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations,6 the International Court
of Justice (ICJ),67 and a growing number of member states s
66. The General Assembly, paramount executive body of the United Nations, has
many times in its resolutions voiced the authority of the Universal Declaration. In the
Russian wives case of 1949, the Assembly declared that the U.S.S.R. was not in conform-
ity with article 55 of the charter (and thereby the Universal Declaration) when it pre-
vented wives of that nationality from leaving the country to join their foreign husbands
abroad. Schwelb, supra note 49, at 341. In 1959, 1961, and 1965, the Assembly called
upon the People's Republic of China to cease practices in Tibet that deprived the people
of their fundamental human rights, and appealed to all states for their best endeavors to
put an end to the practices. Id. In 1953, 1960, and 1963, the Assembly condemned the
racially discriminatory practices of the Union of South Africa. Id. at 342. In its 1960
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the
Assembly proclaimed the duty of every state to "observe faithfully and strictly" the
provisons of the Universal Declaration. L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 10, at
518. Similar wording appeared in the 1963 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination. Id. Both declarations passed by unanimous vote.
67. The ICJ is the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ), the first true international court, which the League of Nations created in 1920.
No state is legally compelled to submit its international disputes to a tribunal, and thus
the ICJ has jurisdiction only when both parties agree to it. In addition, however, the
court issues advisory opinions that help develop international law. In its Advisory Opin-
ion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, [19711 I.C.J. 16, the court affirmed the General Assembly's revocation of South
Africa's 1919 mandate over Namibia (South West Africa) because of continuing racial
discrimination against the natives:
[Vjiewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the
changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpre-
tation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law,
through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law.
Moreover, an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
interpretation.
Id. at 31. The court ruled that "[u]nder the Charter . .. [South Africa] had pledged
itself to observe and respect, in a territory having an international status, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race." South Africa's estab-
lishment of apartheid segregation in Namibia was therefore "a flagrant violation of the
purposes and principles of the Charter." Id. at 57.
68. The Universal Declaration is affirmed in the constitutions of, e.g., Chad, Congo,
Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Burundi, Rwanda,
Libya, Cyprus, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, and
Kenya. E. SCHWELB, HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 50-54 (1964).
Even without such incorporation, states invoke it as law in their external dealings. The
United States, which has not ratified the Universal Declaration and recognizes no inter-
nal obligations toward individuals arising under it, nevertheless cited the Declaration in
its written statement to the ICJ supporting the Namibia decision, note 67 supra. Com-
ment, Individual Enforcement of Obligations Arising Under the United Nations Char-
ter, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 195, 207 (1979).
Internally, United States municipal courts seldom consider article 55 of the United
Nations Charter or the Universal Declaration as rules of decision although the United
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have invoked the Universal Declaration as if it had some real
force. The result is that it does have real force."e Furthermore,
States as a United Nations member has ratified the charter. The United States follows
the doctrine of self-execution of treaties, which means that a duly signed international
agreement that confers enforceable rights on individuals becomes the law of the land.
See Comment, supra; J. STARKz, supra note 20, at 89-102 (internal self-execution of
treaties). Several attempts to plead the Declaration in United States trials have failed,
however, because courts held that it conferred no individual rights. People of Saipan v.
U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974); Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242
P.2d 617 (1952). Contra, Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Or. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949)
(U.S. bound by charter). Several United States opinions, while not based on the charter,
have cited its article 1 ("respect for human rights") as a compelling statement of public
policy. Comment, supra, at 199-202. The Second Circuit recently, in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 49 U.S.L.W. 2039 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980), found a cause of action for an individual
under international human rights law by way of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(1970). The statute gives district courts jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens for torts
committed "in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." It thus
confers an enforceable right on individuals even where a treaty fails to do so. In inter-
preting "law of nations" to include customary international law, the court found that the
plaintiff had a cause of action for the tort of torture because current international usage
and practice confer fundamental rights-including the right to be free from tor-
ture-upon all people. See note 150 infra.
Thus the United States gives at least partial acceptance to international human
rights as principles of internal as well as external law.
69. "The doubts which might have been raised in 1948... have been dispelled by
the constant and consistent practice of the United Nations. . . ." Sohn, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, J. INT'L COMM. Jtusrms, Dec. 1967, at 17, 25. See also
notes 14, 30, 49, & 55 supra. This legal force derives from attitudes about the Universal
Declaration as expressed in words rather than acts. One writer argues that examining
what the states of the world actually do, not what they say, belies any custom of respect
for human rights:
The worldwide intimidation and torture of citizens by their governments is an
undeniable reality. Indeed, it is sufficiently widespread that the "lawbreakers"
are quite possibly in the majority ....
To the layman this Hobbesian state of affairs would lead ineluctably to
the conclusion that either human rights are not subject to the jurisdiction of
international law, or else that the strictures of that system are so ineffective as
to be completely worthless ....
... While it may easily be deduced from the United Nations Charter, the
Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenants, various carefully chosen resolu-
tions, and the works of academic commentators that a consistent pattern of
human rights violations contravenes general international law,.. . [oine's the-
ories must take into account the many situations in which violations of human
rights are tolerated or ignored by the world community.
Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights
Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609, 612, 628. Cf. J. STAMW, supra note
20, at 43-45 (existence of international law must meet double test of opinio juris and
pattern of repeated acts). Watson's argument, however, is directed primarily against the
proposition that human rights norms have an appreciable effect on municipal law. Wat-
son, supra, at 618. This comment is concerned instead with the international forum,
where states espouse and even act upon standards they may nevertheless consider irrele-
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two subsequent documents, the Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees of 1951 and 196770 and the Declaration on Territo-
rial Asylum" of 1967, carry on the impetus of the Universal
Declaration and apply it specifically to refugees.7 Thus, the
Boat People can call on a body of legal principles with a history
of enforceability. 8
The extent of that enforceability is a matter of debate
among legal analysts. The Universal Declaration itself is custom-
ary international law, but it falls short of granting refugees any
right resembling Weis's rule. Rather than a right to claim asy-
lum, however dire the circumstances, the Universal Declaration
concedes to refugees only the right to "enjoy" asylum when a
state voluntarily confers it. 74 The omission is deliberate. In the
discussion among the national representatives drafting the Dec-
laration, no consensus formed to override the traditional doc-
trine of a state's absolute control of its borders. The proponents
of refugee rights settled for the noncommittal "enjoy" phrasing,
neither confirming nor denying individual rights but leaving
vant internally. See note 68 supra.
70. The Protocol, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.IA.S. No. 6577, 606
U.N.T.S. 267, is a restatement of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, supra note 16. The only significant difference is
that it omits the "dateline" in the Convention that restricts its scope to persons who
were refugees prior to Jan. 1, 1951. The Protocol and Convention spell out the rights of a
refugee once he has made entry and is legally present in the asylum country. He is enti-
tled to the same treatment accorded aliens generally; he has free access to the local
courts; he can move around freely and choose his place of residence; and his expulsion
must follow due process of law.
71. See note 3 supra. The declaration makes it a duty of every state not to reject at
the frontier refugees coming directly from a territory where their freedom or lives are
threatened. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 3, art. 3, § 1. There are only
two exceptions: overriding reasons of national security or the need to safeguard the pop-
ulation as in the case of a mass influx. Id. art. 3, § 2.
72. Later instruments that pick up and enlarge upon the language of an earlier one
are evidence of a customary practice. J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 53. In this respect an
instrument lacking the status of customary law may serve as a guide in interpreting the
content of the custom. Supporting this view is an ICJ opinion citing with approval the
concept that "a treaty is to be interpreted 'in the light of its object and purpose' and
that for purposes of interpretation of a treaty, the context comprises 'any subsequent
practice.'" Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd., [19701 I.C.J. 1, 302-04.
73. The Refugees and Asylum documents are adjuncts to the International Bill of
Rights. If the entire Bill had legal force on all states, political refugees would have little
need of the adjunct documents to assert a right to asylum. Covenants in international
law, however, have legal force only on signatories. J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 51. For
the special legal significance of the Universal Declaration, see text accompanying notes
59-73 supra. For a more conservative contemporary view on the force of the Declaration,
see J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 393-94.
74. Universal Declaration, art. 14, § 1, supra note 10, at 109.
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room for future resolution of the issue."5 Later, the issue was
resolved, in favor of individual rights, in the provisions of the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees"" and the Decla-
ration on Territorial Asylum.7 It is important, however, to dis-
tinguish these subsequent documents from the Universal Decla-
ration. Conventions, in United Nations terminology, bind only
the states that sign them. 8 The states of Southeast Asia where
the masses of Boat People are interned 9 have not signed either
the Refugee Convention or the Protocol that restates it. United
Nations declarations, on the other hand, although intended for
the world,80 lack legal weight in themselves;81 the Universal Dec-
laration is an exception by reason of its content s2 and its wide-
spread application. 8 The debate among legal analysts is whether
the subsequent documents have the weight to fill in the deliber-
ate omission of asylum rights in the Universal Declaration.
To a limited extent, the documents do have such weight.
The arguments in their favor are of three basic types. First is
the argument that the International Bill of Rights is a unitary
package; thus, if the parent document, the Universal Declara-
tion, has the force of law, so do all its progeny. 4 Second is the
75. II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 179(ii).
76. See note 18 supra.
77. Id.
78. J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 51.
79. Characteristics of the internment camps are poor shelter, shortages of food and
medicine, and forced idleness and restriction. As an example, a walled-in camp the size
of a football field in downtown Bangkok housed 1,400 Boat People in barracks designed
for 700 persons. Press release by Refugees International, supra note 1.
80. Since the acceptance of Zimbabwe in August 1980, 153 of the 158 independent
states in the world are United Nations members.
81. The General Assembly lacks the power to enact legislation that binds member
states in such areas as human rights. I A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 25. Declara-
tions are formal and solemn instruments used on rare occasions to enunciate great and
lasting principles that the international community is strongly expected to abide by. L.
SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 10, at 519-20.
82. The document was drafted as a manifesto, a pioneering formulation of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the first stage in a program to achieve universally
binding obligations of states. J. STAKE, supra note 20, at 393-94. See notes 10 & 49
supra.
The principles in the Declaration have their own weight as general norms; some
writers consider them jus cogens, or peremptory norms, i.e., so important that any treaty
provision purporting to violate one of these norms would be void. See J. SzTUCK[, Jus
COGENS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
(1974); cf. J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 50-51 (normative treaties). See also note 86 infra.
83. See notes 66-68 supra.
84. This argument assumes that the three subsequent documents in the Bill, see
note 61 supra, are restatements or footnotes to the Universal Declaration, adding noth-
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argument that the widespread conforming practice of states
proves worldwide acceptance of the documents as customary
international law.85 Third is the argument that the documents
themselves are not sources so much as evidence of pre-existing
peremptory normsas without which the United Nations would
have been unable to draft them. All these arguments have their
strengths and weaknesses. The drafting history of the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights indeed suggests a unitary intention; yet the
drafters realized from the first that, because of the deep philo-
sophical differences among states, implementation would have to
come at different rates for different principles.8 7 As for con-
ing essentially new to it. See, e.g., Newman, Foreword to A. GINGER, HUMAN RIGHTS
DOCKET U.S. 1979 at vii. To the extent that the later documents merely clarify or imple-
ment the Universal Declaration, this approach is valid. See note 72 supra. See also
Nanda, From Gandhi to Gandhi-International Legal Responses to the Destruction of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in India, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. 19, 36 (1976)
(Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is authoritative codification of Universal
Declaration).
85. On the validity of words versus deeds as constituting practice, see generally
Watson, supra note 69.
86. "[A] peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and rec-
ognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in
BASIc DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 252 (2d ed. I. Brownlie 1972). "If a new per-
emptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in con-
flict with that norm becomes void and terminates." Id. art. 64, at 256. Suggested sources
of such peremptory norms include general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations, custom, and treaties. J. SzTucKi, supra note 82, § 2.4.4.
87. Thus, in regard to asylum rights, it is bootstrapping to read into the Universal
Declaration anything but a deferential approach to state sovereignty. See text accompa-
nying notes 74-75 supra. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights goes
beyond the Declaration in committing each signatory to "ensure to all individuals within
its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the . . .Covenant,"
one of which rights is an effective remedy to anyone whose rights and freedoms are vio-
lated. Id., art. 2, §§ 1 & 3(a), supra note 61, at 212. The effect is to overturn the entry
doctrine, see text accompanying notes 97-102 infra, and make municipal law accountable
to anyone physically within the state's frontier. While this result is admirable, it is a step
beyond the Declaration and does not comport with current state practice under the Dec-
laration. It is undoubtedly because of this and similar erosions of state sovereignty that
the General Assembly cast the most recent documents in the International Bill of Rights
as covenants and a protocol, enforceable only on states that sign them.
The Universal Declaration has wider effect because it does not bite nearly as deeply.
It lays no definite internal obligation on states unless they so interpret their municipal
law as to accept it. Many states, even those that have ratified the Universal Declaration,
hold it to be non-self-executing at municipal law. See note 68 supra. The scope of the
Declaration is in the uncharted area outside municipal law, where the Boat People are
isolated by their lack of legal entry. Neither the Declaration nor the refugee conventions
require municipal law to acknowledge the Boat People: if a state may not arbitrarily
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forming practice, the strongest evidence is the incorporation of
the nonrepatriation rule in the constitutions of thirty-six
states.a8 On the other hand, those thirty-six are a minority
among the 158 independent states that now exist in the world. "
The third argument interprets the United Nations documents,
the constitutional provisions, related treaties, and behavior of
states as cumulative manifestations of the same underlying
norm. If this norm exists,90 however, it is hard to understand
why it did not form the basis of world response to the refugee
crisis of 1979. Rather than assert the Boat People's right to asy-
lum, the community of nations pressured Vietnam into a further
return them to persecution, it still may ship them anywhere else without a hearing. To
require more of states at this time without their consent is probably pushing customary
law further than it yet goes.
88. S. SINHA, supra note 2, at 86 n.102; Weis, supra note 47, at 288 n.27. A greater
number of states-somewhat less than half the membership of the United
Nations-have bound themselves to the rule externally by signing the 1951 convention
or the 1967 protocol on refugees. Report of the UNHCR, 32 GAOR, Supp. (No. 12) 7,
U.N. Doc. A/32/12 (1977); see note 18 supra.
89. INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 126 (34th ed. 1980).
90. There is much debate and little consensus on which norms of international law
are so fundamental as to be peremptory. J. SZTUCKI, supra note 82, § 2.4.5. Common
norms include pacta sunt servanda, J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 63-64, and the prohibi-
tions against piracy and use of force between nations, J. SZTUCKI, supra note 82, § 3.5, at
120. Not even the nearly universal condemnations of slavery and of genocide were recog-
nized by more than a bare majority at the United Nations Conference on the Law of
Treaties, Vienna, 1968-1969, which drafted the Vienna Convention, as being peremptory.
Id. at 121. The peremptory status of human rights norms is still more doubtful. See id. §
2.4.5, at 85-86 (proposal of human rights as peremptory norms (jus cogens) unlikely had
not United Nations Charter already provided for them).
Any discussion of international norms runs the danger of assuming that rules arising
in the West, where they have a long history, represent a world consensus. One writer
states that "in both East and West, writers on international law are virtually unanimous
in their acceptance of the idea of an international jus cogens." E. Suv, THE CONCEPT OF
Jus Cogens IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1967). Writers, however, are not states.
Although 79 of 110 national delegations (i.e., writers) at the Vienna Conference approved
the Vienna Convention, the Convention has yet to receive the ratification of 35 govern-
ments that is required to put it into force. J. SZTUCKI, supra note 82, § 1, at 3. It is also
significant that the Marxist states, active supporters of the concept of peremptory
norms, consistently fail to include international protection of human rights in that cate-
gory. Id. § 2.4.5, at 86.
The concept of peremptory norms derives from theories of natural law, an ideal law
founded on the nature of man as a reasonable being. Unfortunately the content of such
law varies widely according to the interpreter's own philosophical orientation; and its
general inefficacy as a modern doctrine shows in the inability of the Vienna conferees to
draw up an authoritative list of peremptory norms. For discussion of natural law in rela-
tion to international law, see J. STAsKE, supra note 20, at 23-25; J. SZTUCKI, supra note
82, § 2.4.2; Watson, supra note 69, at 613-17. On natural law generally, see Carbonneau,
The Implicit Teaching of Utopian Speculations: Rousseau's Contribution to the Natu-
ral Law Tradition. 3 U. PUGET SD. L. Rav. 123. 123-38 (1979).
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denial of their rights by sealing off her own borders and stopping
the emigration."1 Clearly the Boat People's general right to claim
asylum is on shaky ground if it rests on these three broad lines
of argument.
A narrower source of authority, the abovementioned special
case of Weis's rule,' 2 offers less-than-general relief but rests on a
firmer foundation. The principle of non-refoulement, or
nonreconduction,3 possesses the cachet of age and usage, and,
moreover, speaks to the security of those Boat People who
already have some kind of asylum. For nearly fifty years this
principle has limited forcible repatriation, and its inclusion in
the Refugee Protocol" establishes its place in international
human rights law." Non-refoulement, however, has one large
hurdle: it assumes acknowledgment of the refugees' legal pres-
ence by the state whose territory they have physically entered."
Therefore, before discussing non-refoulement it is necessary to
understand states' current usage of the "presence" definition
and why it is ripe for reform.
LEGAL PRESENCE AND THE ENTRY DOCTRINE
Sanctuary is one of the oldest concepts of international
law.'7 Because sovereignty derives from control of territory, a
91. Hanoi Said to Agree to Attempt to Halt Exodus of Refugees, N.Y. Times, July
22, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 6. That measure was itself a violation of another article of the
Universal Declaration: "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own
.... Universal Declaration, art. 13, § 2, supra note 10, at 109.
92. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
93. See II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 178.
94. See note 18 supra.
95. See note 72 supra.
96. Another hurdle is lack of unanimity as to whether non-refoulement is a legal
principle or merely a moral one. Either way, it has enough consensual foundation to be a
basis of political action. See note 137 infra.
97. Socinus raises the question whether it is permissible to take an enemy pris-
oner, if he is found in the territory of a third party, i.e., outside the boundaries
of the belligerents. He presents arguments on either side, and concludes at
length that this is not permissible, citing Angelus, and the rulings in Code, I.
xii. 5 and 6. There is support, also, in the statement of Bartolus that a person
arrested in another's territory, even by the officers of a local judge, is not
legally arrested and his release may be demanded ....
II P. BELLI, DE RE Mnrrmu Er BELLO TRACTATUS 98-99 (1563) (Classics of Int'l L. ed.,
No. 18, 1936) (footnotes omitted). "Since no nation can claim any right for itself in the
territory of another, it is not allowable to enter with an armed force into the territory of
another and take therefrom a fugitive criminal or one hiding there." II C. WOLFF, Jus
GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM § 294 (1764) (Classics of Int'l L. ed., No.
13, 1934). See also Nayar, The Right of Asylum in International Law: Its Status and
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fugitive who sets foot across a frontier is secure from the threat
of bodily persecution by his official pursuers." At the same time
he becomes automatically liable to the state on whose land he
stands for any wrongs he may commit therein. The rule of sanc-
tuary lacks consistency, however, in at least one sense: it says
nothing about the refugee's reciprocal rights in the asylum coun-
try. International human rights doctrine, proceeding along a sep-
arate line of development, has thus far failed to resolve that
inconsistency;" it contains no rule of reciprocity for individual
rights and duties. If there were such a rule, it might resolve two
legal anomalies that place the Boat People in a position of une-
qual protection.100
The first anomaly arises from the classical right of any state
selectively to grant or withhold entry '0 to any who apply at its
frontiers. The term "entry" is used with a plasticity that reflects
the practical difficulty of patrolling a frontier. No state can
police every inch of its borders. In recognition of this fact, inter-
Prospects, 17 ST. Louis L.J. 17 (1972).
Sanctuary traditionally has been accorded at the will of the granting sovereign. II A.
GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 199.
98. II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 199. "The fact that every State exercises
territorial supremacy over all persons on its territory, whether they are its subjects or
aliens, excludes the exercise of the power of foreign States over its nationals in the terri-
tory of another State." I L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 12, § 316.
99. But see II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 199 ("[The accepting] State has
become responsible under international law for the treatment to which the individual
concerned is thereafter subjected."). Nevertheless many countries, especially those where
refugees arrive by sea, sidestep the issue via the legal fiction that such refugees are not
present. Comment, supra note 2, at 594-95.
A strict rule of reciprocity would require that, just as the refugee is liable at munici-
pal law for his wrongs, his rights must be enforceable within that same legal system, not
merely at international law. Grahl-Madsen's statement of state responsibility, then, even
if generally accepted, is inadequate. The state has the power to initiate process at munic-
ipal law, and the refugee has correlative liability to that process. The reciprocal, however,
is untrue: the state and all its citizens have immunity against municipal action by the
refugee, who has a correlative disability to initiate process. In view of the lack of reme-
dies left to the refugee at international law, see text accompanying notes 20-23 supra,
this is a serious disability. For a formative discussion of jural correlatives and reciprocal
relations, see Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), reprinted in W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CON-
CEPTONs 23 (1923).
100. "Equal protection" herein means equality with the protection accorded aliens
whose presence is legally recognized. See text accompanying notes 118-25 infro. Rights
peculiar to citizens, such as voting, are not part of such protection. For a discussion of
international standards on protection of aliens, see F. GARCIA-AMADOR, L. SOHN, & R.
BAXTER, RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO
ALIENS 1-20 (1974).
101. See note 22 supra.
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national custom allows each state to set up reasonable control
points within its territory and call those its places of entry.10 2 A
state can hold applicants for asylum at these control points until
it makes an administrative determination of their status.
Meanwhile the applicants are in limbo. Without a grant of
entry, they lack legal presence; they cannot assert the rights the
sovereign normally grants aliens in its territory. The sovereign,
however, through its control of the territory can assert its power
against them. It can and often does punish them for infractions
of its criminal code-or can simply send them back without a
hearing to whatever fate awaits them in their country of ori-
gin.103 The more flexible a state's use of the entry concept, the
more glaring is the discrepancy between physical and legal pres-
ence. Many of the Boat People are held in camps many miles
inside national frontiers yet still are not considered "present." 104
The United States' practice exhibits the greatest discrep-
ancy between physical and legal presence. Despite restrictive
immigration laws,'0 5 the executive branch has exercised compas-
sion to allow more than 378,000 Indochinese refugees' 06 into the
country since 1975. These refugees have a special status known
as parole. 0 7 They may move around within the borders, live
where they want, and accept employment with few restric-
tions. s08 Nevertheless they lack legal presence and are, thus, sub-
102. An example of such a control point in the United States is an immigration
center like Ellis Island. See Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925).
103. See Comment, Refugee-Parolee: The Dilemma of the Indochina Refugee, 13
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 175, 182-83 (1975).
104. Whether the Southeast Asian nations have made any formal definition of pres-
ence is difficult to say; none has been asked of them. Their practice of arbitrary return to
the frontier and crowding in camps is not consistent, however, with a grant of legal pres-
ence. Cf. Comment, supra note 1, at 592 n.100 (noting that information on the practice
of many states is inaccessible).
105. The number of immigration visas available to aliens from countries not within
the Western Hemisphere is limited to 170,000 per year. Comment, supra note 103, at
188.
106. 125 CoNG. REC., supra note 27 (378,000 as of December 1979); Comment, supra
note 11, at 139 (160,000 as of 1975).
107. The Attorney General has discretion under the parole power of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), to admit aliens tem-
porarily in the public interest. Parole is not considered a grant of entry. In practice, the
Attorney General delegates the parole power to immigration officials in individual cases;
but the President sometimes uses the power to accept groups of refugees en masse. Pres-
ident Eisenhower in 1956 first invoked the parole authority for this purpose when he
admitted refugees from the turmoil in Hungary. See Comment, supra note 103, at 176
n.9, 177, 179.
108. The Attorney General has discretion to grant parole "under such conditions as
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ject to expulsion from the country '1 " by administrative fiat. The
normal constitutional guarantee of judicial review for aliens
after a deportation decision by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service (INS) is closed to them.110 Authority for this prac-
tice is section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952,111 which the United States Supreme Court interpreted
he may prescribe," 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), and could thereby restrict parolees
either to camps or to a specific geographic area. Comment, supra note 11, at 146, 158. In
fact, the Indochinese refugees are spread throughout the country, and Congress has
appropriated money to aid them in resettlement. Id. at 157 & n.155.
Permanent resident aliens have the constitutional right to earn a livelihood in the
United States, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915), but this right does not extend to
other classes of aliens. Nonimmigrant aliens generally may not work without special per-
mission, and illegal aliens have no right whatever to pursue employment. 1 C. GORDON &
H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.34a (rev. ed. 1980). Congress, how-
ever, granted the Indochinese parolees exemption from the special permission require-
ment in the 1976 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
571, § 212(a)(14), 90 Stat. 2703 (1976) (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(14) (West Supp.
1980)).
109. The expulsion process for an alien without legal presence is termed exclusion.
The deportation process has constitutional safeguards to ensure that "no person shall be
deprived of his liberty without opportunity, at some time, to be heard .... " The Japa-
nese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903). Exclusion, on the other hand, has no con-
stitutional requirement for either a hearing (although some statutes require a hearing) or
judicial review. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). See H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 11, at 29-30.
110. Comment, supra note 11, at 146-47. Even where a statute ensures a hearing,
judicial review is essential to equal protection because of the relative lack of formal
courtroom procedure. Such hearings are conducted entirely by INS officials, on INS
premises, and by INS rules. One writer points out the shortcomings:
[T]he subject does not have most of the rights granted an accused criminal,
among them the power to subpoena witnesses. Undocumented aliens are not
entitled to Miranda warnings, and until recently they did not have a right to
counsel at initial hearings or interrogations. Even now it has been mandated
that no public monies can be used for their legal defense. There is no burden
of proof which must be presented at these hearings, and hearsay evidence is
common. Mass hearings and deportations still exist despite court actions stall-
ing what are called MASH (multiple accelerated summary hearings).
Manna, Human Rights ... Human Wrongs, STUDENT LAWYER, Mar. 1980, at 32, 37.
Deportation and exclusion hearings are not considered criminal proceedings, and
thus the type of hearing described above is considered fair under the requirements of the
fifth amendment to the Constitution. See Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912). It
has been held that a hearing under the Immigration and Nationality Act does not deny
due process even though the presiding officer is controlled and supervised by INS offi-
cials charged with investigative and prosecuting functions. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302, 311 (1955). On the general subject, see Mandelker, Exclusion and Removal Legisla-
tion, 1956 Wis. L. Rav. 57; Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for
Reform, 56 COLUM. L. Rav. 309 (1956); Note, The Rights of Aliens in Deportation Pro-
ceedings, 31 IND. L.J. 218 (1956); Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Expulsion and
Exclusion of Aliens, 37 MINN. L. RaV. 440 (1953).
111. The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States
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in Leng May Ma v. Barber.112 Leng May Ma was a native of the
People's Republic of China who sought entry into the United
States under a claim of citizenship and was paroled into the
country while the INS investigated her claim. When the INS
found the claim insubstantial, it ordered her excluded. She peti-
tioned for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that as an "alien
within the United States" under the Act"' she could invoke the
protection accorded aliens who would suffer physical persecution
or death if returned to their own country. 1 4 The Court ruled
that, even though free on parole, Leng was not legally "within
the United States": her legal status was the same as if she had
been stopped and held at the border."' On that basis, the Court
held that the protection against repatriation did not apply to
her and that she had no constitutional right to invoke habeas
corpus."u  Subsequent decisions have followed the same reason-
ing. 1 7 It is thus possible for the Boat People in the United
States to have all the duties of a resident and most of the privi-
leges"' but lack any assertable legal security in that status.
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or
for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admis-
sion to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded
as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the
opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith
return ....
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976).
112. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
113. Id. at 186.
114. The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion
and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for such reason.
8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976).
115. 357 U.S. at 189.
116. Id. at 190.
117. Wong Hing Fun v. Esperdy, 335 F.2d 656, 657 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
970 (1964) (parolees are "outside the United States and not entitled to assert rights
under the Constitution"). Justice Douglas assailed the logic of Leng May Ma in a dis-
sent: "How an alien can be paroled 'into the United States' and yet not be 'within the
United States' remains a mystery." 357 U.S. at 192.
A 1961 amendment to the Immigration and Naturalization Act provides for habeas
corpus review following any final exclusion or deportation order. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1976),
as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5a, 75 Stat. 651 (1961). Such reviews, however,
have made only slow progress in affecting the conduct of INS hearings. See note 110
supra and text accompanying notes 140-45 infra.
118. Congress has granted the Indochinese parolees the right to work and the paral-
lel duty to pay taxes, and has made special government benefits available. Comment,
supra note 11, at 147-48 & nn.86-88.
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The second anomaly arising from the separation of doc-
trines is that an alien illegally within the state1 9 can assert more
rights than an honest applicant for asylum who gains admission
through regular administrative action but is denied legal entry.
The distinction derives originally from a definition of alien sta-
tus in part based on the extent to which the alien has estab-
lished himself 20 in the country. Somewhat like the serf of old
who could free himself by eluding his master for a year and a
day, an illegal alien in the United States can establish himself by
functioning as part of a community for a while 2' before the INS
discovers him. He reaps the reward of his dishonesty by acquir-
ing the same constitutional rights as a resident alien in removal
proceedings.12 2 The declared parolee, by contrast, is precluded
by his lack of legal presence from ever establishing himself no
matter how important he may be to his community.'23 But for
that arbitrary distinction, most parolees suffer fewer disabilities
than illegals 24 and, thus, could better meet the test of establish-
ment in terms of sanctioned societal expectations, responsibili-
ties, and relationships. The United Nations Charter, through
article 7 of the Universal Declaration, which provides that all are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to equal protection of the law, seems to demand a consistent
application of the establishment test to all aliens, whether legal,
illegal, or paroled. 26
119. An illegal alien may be either one who arrived legally and changed his status,
or one who crossed the border surreptitiously or using false credentials. Id. at 143 & 145.
120. Id. at 145.
121. [Ilt is not competent for. . . any executive officer. . . arbitrarily to cause
an alien, who has entered the country, and has become subject in all respects
to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although alleged to be illegally
here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all opportunity
to be heard upon the questions involving his right to be and remain in the
United States. No such arbitrary power can exist where the principles involved
in due process of law are recognized.
The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903).
122. Comment, supra note 11, at 143, 145. The illegal entrant is entitled to a depor-
tation hearing, whereas the parolee is statutorily limited to an exclusion hearing.
Although the grounds for exclusion and deportation are similar, the grounds are applied
more broadly in exclusion proceedings. See Note, Refugees Under United States Immi-
gration Law, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 528, 536-37 (1975).
123. The Ninth Circuit has held that a parolee who resided continuously in the
country for 20 years was never "physically present." Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney Gen. of
United States, 479 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
124. An illegal alien, for example, may not seek employment. Immigration and Nat-
uralization Act § 212(a)(14), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976).
125. Immigration policy is so entwined with political measures that the courts
1980]
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The parole practice of the United States is the extreme
example that illustrates the logical absurdity of the continuing
lack of correlation between asylum and legal presence. Whatever
sound administrative purpose the entry doctrine once had, the
United States (and other states to a lesser degree) has divorced
it from any reasonable relation to the policing of frontiers. The
executive branch and, later, Congress" a6 seized upon the doctrine
as a convenient means to serve public sentiment without making
binding commitments. If the Boat People should wear out their
welcome-or the Cuban expellees, the Hungarian "freedom
fighters," the Russian Old Believers, or any of the other groups
the executive has admitted on parole" 7 -wholesale exclusion is
a quick and quiet way to get rid of them.18 Other countries are
similarly motivated to avoid giving a toehold to alien national or
cultural groups that are or may become unpopular. Their rea-
sons are often valid,"9' and enjoy a presumption of validity
under the state sovereignty doctrine.130 Valid reasons neverthe-
less do not justify methods that bypass due process. It is time
for international legal authority to limit the entry doctrine
expressly to its original purpose. If the Boat People's security
from persecution is a basic human right, as is evident in the
constantly waver in deciding between an administrative measure and constitu-
tional precepts .... Changes in policy come so quickly that (immigration
advocate] Aberson recently set up a hot line in his office so other immigration
lawyers can call in for a recorded message detailing the latest developments.
Manna, supra note 110, at 56.
126. Comment, supra note 103, at 179-82.
127. Id. at 180-81.
128. In response to the continuing criticism of parole as a wholesale practice, Sena-
tor Kennedy introduced a bill, H.R. 2816 and S. 643, in the 96th Congress to limit parole
to its original role in individual cases of hardship and admit further Indochinese refugees
as "lawful permanent residents." Such admissions would be in a class called "refugees of
special concern to the United States," to be designated by the President in consultation
with Congress. 125 CoNG. Rzc. H12,415 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1979). See Refugee Act of
1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 10, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). Congress passed the Senate version, S. 643, as the Refugee Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
129. Political motivation in controlling immigration is not reprehensible per se. The
political stability of Malaysia, for instance, as that government perceives it, depends on
maintaining a delicate ethnic balance that could be skewed by admitting thousands of
refugees of one ethnic group. See Indochinese Refugees, supra note 19, at 33; Malaysia
Reports 13,000 Refugees Expelled, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2; Thais on
Refugees: West Must Take Them, id., June 20, 1979, § A, at 3, col. 1.
130. Courts are disinclined to examine the legitimacy of a foreign state's public
action. N. LEEcH, C. OLIVER, & J. SwEmNE, CASES AND MATEmRIAS ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYsTErM 392-93 (1973) ("act of state" doctrine).
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Universal Declaration, 11 it is too important to depend on the
favor of a legislature or the unreviewable ruling of a bureaucrat.
THE RIGHT TO CONTINUED PRESENCE: Non-Refoulement
Boat People who succeed in establishing their legal presence
at international law thereupon come within the scope of non-
refoulement, a principle that addresses the first need of any ref-
ugee: freedom from forcible return. The moral authority of this
principle in international law is well established. Its history goes
back to 1933, when the Convention Relating to the International
Status of Refugees'3 2 incorporated a provision that the con-
tracting parties agreed not to reconduct (refouler) refugees
across the borders of their country of origin.133 The rule gained
broad currency with its adoption in the Refugee Convention of
1951.1s4 That convention had been in effect only a few months
when the United Nations Conference on the Status of Stateless
Persons"3 6 unanimously declared non-refoulement a "generally
accepted principle."136 The General Assembly subsequently
endorsed the principle by adopting it as part of the Declaration
on Territorial Asylum.13 7
131. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, arts. 6-12, 18-20, supra note 10, at 108-10.
132. Done Oct. 28, 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. 199.
133. Id. ch. 2, art. 3, § 2. The English translation read that each of the contracting
parties "undertakes in any case not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of their
countries of origin." Id. The French term now is substituted for the English because that
passage contained an error. "Refuse entry" was a mistranslation of "refouler," which
actually means "send back." Thus the provision refers only to refugees already in the
territory. See II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 179(i).
The Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, done
Feb. 10, 1938, 192 L.N.T.S. 59, restated the rule. Both documents, however, were signed
by only a small number of nations, and thus the rule did not have the status of a general
principle before World War II. See II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 178(ii).
134. Done July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, supra note 16.
135. This conference assembled to draft the Convention Relating to the Status of
Stateless Persons, done Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, supra note 33. II A. GRAHL-
MADSEN, supra note 3, § 178(ii).
136. II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3, § 178(ii). The statement does not carry the
same weight as a pronouncement in an ICJ decision, nor does any such statement estab-
lish a principle as customary law in the absence of actual worldwide practice, whether
recognized or tacit.
137. Supra note 18. Some writers refuse to call non-refoulement a legal principle,
although consensus exists that it has standing as at least a moral principle. Starke calls it
a standard or desideratum of international law but not a guarantee. J. STARKE, supra
note 20, at 388. Grahl-Madsen would afford it only the status of a moral means of con-
vincing a government, not a basis for legal argument. II A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 3,
§ 178(); A. GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL AsYLuM § 4.2.2 (1980). Nayar refers to non-
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Adding to the legal force of non-refoulement is its parallel
development in the United States, which began in 1950 although
the United States did not endorse the Refugee Convention until
1968.138 Similar to its use of the entry doctrine, the United
States has applied the principle selectively; but that approach is
slowly changing. The selectivity derives from the phrasing of the
amended Internal Security Act, which since 1950 has enjoined
the Attorney General from deporting an alien to a country where
he would be persecuted. 139 The Act's definition of persecution,
however, is limited to "persecution on account of race, religion,
or political opinion"; 140 and furthermore the Attorney General
(through the INS) has the discretion to decide on the existence
of such persecution.14' Under the later provision, the INS acted
as both judge and jury on the factual question of persecution
until a 1977 court decision held that due process to a refugee
barred the INS from selectively excluding certain kinds of
evidence.
The case was Coriolan v. INS,"2 in which the court allowed
a Haitian refugee to present evidence of general political condi-
tions in his country as justification for claiming asylum. 143 Hai-
tian refugees, like the Boat People, flee their country by sea and
arrive at other shores (in their case, Florida) in oftentimes des-
perate condition. Like the Boat People, they say they are fleeing
political persecution. Unlike the Boat People, however, they are
refoulement as a "negative principle that has now emerged" without specifying its
nature. He implies, however, that it is a legal principle by way of its clear prohibition,
contrasting it to a duty to admit, which states are reluctant to recognize because of the
positive burden it would impose. Nayar, supra note 97, at 43.
138. The United States has been a party to very few United Nations conventions
because of a pervasive fear that the self-execution of treaties in municipal law would
subvert the Constitution or subject the nation to rule by international tribunal. The high
point of that fear was the nearly successful effort in the Senate, from 1952 to 1955, to
pass the Bricker Amendment, which in its various forms would limit the treaty-making
power, eliminate self-execution of treaties, or give Congress the power to regulate all
executive agreements. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 11, at 486-90; Finch, The
Need to Restrain the Treaty-Making Power of the United States Within Constitutional
Limits, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1954); Whitton & Fowler, Bricker Amendment-Fallacies
and Dangers, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 23 (1954); Comment, Individual Enforcement of Obliga-
tions Arising Under the United Nations Charter, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 195 (1979).
139. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
140. Id. On the INS interpretation of this phrase, see Note, supra note 122, at 683-
87.
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970).
142. 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977).
143. Id. at 1004.
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fleeing an anticommunist government that is friendly to the
United States, and this fact has made a significant difference in
their treatment under the Internal Security Act. " ' One inequity,
prior to Coriolan, was the INS requirement that they present
evidence of their personal liability to persecution, whereas refu-
gees from communist countries-like the Boat People-needed
to show only the general political conditions they were escap-
ing. 1 5 The Fifth Circuit in Coriolan, invoking the authority of
the Refugee Protocol,"14 held that the same evidentiary standard
should apply to all irrespective of national policy or administra-
tive discretion" 7 and, therefore, that an Amnesty International
report on conditions in Haiti was admissible evidence in Corio-
lan's hearing."48 Coriolan is only one step in removing the ineq-
uities of non-refoulement as practiced by the United States;"49
144. The criteria for entry, "persecution on account of race, religion or political
opinion," can be used restrictively to bar entry of those whose persecution does not fit
under those labels. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1970). The "boat people" from Haiti contend
that they are the victims of such a slanted application:
The dispute concerns whether the Haitians are fleeing political persecu-
tion or are victims of intense poverty. The U.S. is bound by international pro-
tocol to let political refugees stay. But the Haitians, according to their support-
ers, are the victims of the U.S. government's double standard . . . . Under a
set of regulations left over from the Cold War, nearly anyone who comes from
a Communist country or from the Middle East is a "political refugee" ....
But those claiming asylum from right-wing governments, no matter how
blatantly oppressive, have had a far more difficult time gaining entry, since
they must prove with documents and witnesses that they personally will be
subject to persecution if they return.
Krajick, Refugees Adrift, SATURDAY REvmw, Oct. 27, 1979, at 17.
145. See Note, Coriolan v. Immigration and Naturalization Service: A Closer Look
at Immigration Law and the Political Refugee, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 133
(1978).
146. Administration testimony before Congress at the time of the hearings about
signing the Protocol gave the impression that the Protocol would have no internal effect
on United States immigration laws, which were considered a model for the world. Other-
wise Congress probably would not have approved the signing. See note 138 supra. See
also Comment, Immigration Law and the Refugee-A Recommendation to Harmonize
the Statutes with the Treaties, 6 CALMP. W. INT'L L.J. 129, 133, 136 (1975).
147. 559 F.2d at 1004.
148. Id.
149. Note, supra note 145. For other progress in the same field, see Sannon v.
United States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Fla.), vacated and remanded for decision on
possible mootness, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1977), on remand 460 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Fla.
1978) (held not moot). The issue was whether 300 paroled Haitian refugees could claim
political asylum at an exclusion hearing; Judge Lawrence King held that a full, fair
adversary hearing under the Refugee Protocol required the INS immigration judge to let
the aliens present their claim, thus putting them on the same procedural footing as
deportable aliens under the Protocol. 427 F. Supp. at 1277. On remand from the Fifth
Circuit to determine mootness under new INS hearing regulations, Judge King held the
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but the decision is important in that it places the principle sol-
idly in the field of law, not policy, and uses the International Bill
of Rights as a specific ground of decision.1 50 Coming from the
United States, Coriolan is persuasive authority that non-
refoulement is a legal and not only a moral principle1 " and is
therefore available for the Boat People's use in an international
forum.
THE PROBLEM OF STANDING
Of course, to plead any principle in an international forum,
the Boat People must first gain access to the forum. Formidable
obstacles stand in their way. Because they have no international
juridical standing as individuals, 15 2 some international person
(state) must step in to represent them. Because international
rules of standing have developed along the same lines as munici-
pal rules of standing, the litigant must have a real interest in the
case not moot because the regulations, were improperly promulgated, and continued a
stay order on exclusion proceedings until issuance and review of properly promulgated
regulations. 460 F. Supp. at 468. In dictum, Judge King called the new regulations insuf-
ficient as well because they retained the summary judgment procedure for excludable
aliens. Neither the former nor the new regulations, he noted, had a counterpart to that
procedure for aliens classified as deportable. Id. at 466 & n.31.
150. Another recent advance in the use of the Bill in the United States is Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 49 U.S.L.W. 2039 (2d Cir. June 30, 1980), supra note 68, where the court
found a right of action for the tort of official torture even though both plaintiff and
defendant were nationals of Paraguay and the alleged tort had occurred in Paraguay.
The plaintiff, Dr. Joel Filartiga, alleged that the defendant, a former inspector general of
the Paraguayan police, had tortured and killed his son, Joelito Filartiga, in 1976 in retal-
iation for the plaintiff's political activities. The applicable international law condemning
torture was the Universal Declaration, art. 5, supra note 10, at 108; the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, supra note 61, at 214; the American Decla-
ration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XXVI, Res. XXX, 9th Int'l Conf. of Ameri-
can States (1948), reprinted in BAsIc DocUMENTs ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 10, at
393-94; and the American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5, § 2, signed Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at 1, id. at 402. Tuttle & Schneebaum, Tort Action in US
Court for Torture in Paraguay: Amicus Brief, 37 GUn.D PRAC. 67 (1980). Not one of the
cited documents has effect as a treaty within the United States; the court recognized the
force of the "clear and unambiguous" torture prohibition entirely as customary interna-
tional law. Furthermore, the decision recognizes an individual right of action when fun-
damental human rights are violated, even where all parties are nationals of the same
state, and universal jurisdiction to prosecute such actions, as exists for piracy and war
crimes. See J. STARKE, supra note 20, at 307-12 (universal jurisdiction).
151. The United States is committed to non-refoulement as a signer of the Protocol.
Thus Coriolan cannot be persuasive in nonsignatory states unless non-refoulement tran-
scends the Protocol; the relatively long history of the principle, however, and its endorse-
ment by the United Nations indicate that it does. See text accompanying notes 132-37
supra.
152. See note 23 supra.
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case.153 This means ordinarily that the state of the individual's
citizenship must represent him-a rule of small help to political
refugees, who by definition are rejected by their own state. A
more promising possibility for the Boat People is the modern
extension of international juridical standing to international
organizations as well as states. In the Advisory Opinion on Rep-
aration for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations,'" the ICJ determined that the United Nations itself is
an international person with the right to bring a claim against a
government in the capacity of itself or its agents. 55 Later deci-
sions have recognized the right of specialized agencies of the
United Nations to seek ICJ advisory opinions on questions"arising within the scope of their activities."' 5 ' These decisions
have settled the issue that the United Nations and its constitu-
ent organizations may adjudicate the claims of their agents or
other individuals' 7 if necessary to carry out their functions. Fol-
153. It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to
protect its subjects. ... By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the
person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction), 11924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2. The
Mavrommatis decision was quoted in the Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4, where the
lack of any real interest on the part of Liechtenstein, despite its grant of naturalization
to German citizen Friedrich Nottebohm, prevented it from pressing Nottebohm's claim
for admission to Guatemala:
That naturalization was not based on any real prior connection with Liechten-
stein, nor did it in any way alter the manner of life of the person upon whom it
was conferred in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation ....
Guatemala is under no obligation to recognize a nationality granted in
such circumstances. Liechtenstein consequently is not entitled to extend its
protection to Nottebohm vis-a-vis Guatemala ...
Id. at 26.
154. [1949] I.C.J. 174.
155. See note 23 supra.
156. U.N. CHARTR art. 96, § 2. See, e.g., Application for Review of Judgment No.
158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, [19731 I.C.J. 166
[hereinafter referred to as Application for Review]. In that decision the court held that a
broad interpretation of "scope of activities" was necessary to enable the United Nations
to accomplish its purposes and function effectively. Id. at 172.
157. The real party in interest in the Application for Review case was Mohamed
Fasla, a former official of the United Nations Development Programme, contesting in an
individual capacity the procedure whereby the UNDP terminated his employment.
[1973] I.C.J. at 168-70. On the question of proceedings involving individuals, the court
stated that "[tihe mere fact that it is not the rights of States which are in issue in the
proceedings cannot suffice to deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it
by its Statute." Id. at 172.
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lowing that logic, the Office of the UNHCR should be able to
claim non-refoulement for the Boat People-at least those in
the camps for which it is responsible5 8 -when forcible return
interferes with the agency's mission.159
Administrative and executive actions are other avenues of
redress that do not depend on technical rules of international
personhood. Thus, certain specialized agencies of the United
Nations have internal provisions for petitions by individuals.160
The General Assembly, the executive body of the United
Nations, may make resolutions about areas of concern. 1 '
Enforcement of any such resolutions can occur only through
consensual behavior of the community of nations; but this is
true as well of international administrative and judicial deci-
158. The UNHCR staffs or helps financially to support a number of the Boat People
camps in Southeast Asia. Report of the UNHCR, supra note 88, at 41-43. Most of the
camps have a chronic lack of space, sanitary facilities, food, and medical aid. N.Y. Times,
supra note 24, at 14, col. 2.
159. Decisions to date have based reparations to United Nations agencies on the
extent to which the organization was hindered in its capacity to discharge its functions.
The Reparations opinion, however, referred in dictum to "damage to the interests of
which [an international agency] is the guardian" as a basis for reparations. [1949] I.C.J.
at 180. By the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR, that official is charged with "interna-
tional protection" of the interests of refugees. See note 41 supra, ch. II, arts. 6 & 7. The
UNHCR's work is on a voluntary basis, see text accompanying notes 40-41 supra, yet
because the statute establishes the office as guardian of the refugees' interests, the office
theoretically could represent them in requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ. Stat-
ute of the ICJ, supra note 23, art. 65 ("The Court may give an advisory opinion on any
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request."). See generally Weis,
supra note 8, at 207-21; I A. GRAHL-MADsEN, supra note 3, § 30; J. STARKE, supra note
20, at 75, 79.
160. Under the Constitution of the International Labour Organization, industrial
associations of employers or workers may make representations to the Governing Body
of the International Labour Office, and any member state of the organization has the
right to file a complaint if dissatisfied with the performance of another state. I A. GRAmL-
MADSEN, supra note 3, § 31(iv). In addition, the European Human Rights Convention
allows "any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to
be the victim of a violation" to petition the European Commission of Human Rights,
which may then bring the case before the European Court of Human Rights. European
Convention on Human Rights, arts. 25(1) & 48, signed Nov. 4, 1950, [1951] Gr. Brit. T.S.
Misc. No. 1 (Cmd. 8130), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in BASc DOCuMENTS ON HuAN
RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 346-47, 351. Similarly, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights sets up a Human Rights Committee to investigate human rights viola-
tions and refer them to a Conciliation Commission, id. arts. 28, 41, 42(1)(a), supra note
10, at 221, 225-27, and the Optional Protocol authorizes the Human Rights Committee to
receive petitions from aggrieved individuals, id. art. 1, supra note 10. Such procedures
are prototypes for possible expanded representation of individuals through routes other
than their direct sovereign states.
161. But see note 78 supra.
Asylum for Boat People?
sions.'12 Because consensus is the basis of all international law,
the greatest force for world justice is, as one commentator put it,
the "mobilization of shame. "
A point in favor of a limited right of asylum along the lines
drawn herein is the fact that it is not a great departure from
current world understandings. It does not affect a state's right to
refuse admission at the border or, alternatively, to expel a refu-
gee to a third country. It has no impact on a state's municipal
laws. It calls only for a narrow implementation of a generally
recognized principle, non-refoulement, that is already a volun-
tary practice in most of the world. It is not without difficulties,
notably the problem of enforcement; that is, without the appli-
cation of world political pressure there can be no enforcement.
Evidence that such pressure is available, even if misdirected, is
the political inducement applied to Vietnam to cut off the refu-
gee exodus last year.' The use of such pressure to spread the
burden of misery, rather than to concentrate the burden at its
source, would in the long run do more to ease it.168
CONCLUSION
The Boat People's security from return can come about only
through right, not through bestowal. A number of states have
made a gesture of accepting Boat People without a grant of
entry; but such gestures, however well meant and however
accompanied by privileges, are not based on legal principles and
thus do little to advance the recognition of a right to asylum.
Charitable gestures in fact make recognition more remote by
easing the pressure to find a legal solution. The modest step of
rationalizing the entry doctrine, as proposed in this comment,
could bring about a limited exception to the prevailing treat-
162. See note 56 supra.
163. Newman, supra note 84.
164. Hanoi Said to Agree to Attempt to Halt Exodus of Refugees, supra note 91.
United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, who negotiated the measure, did not
reveal the nature of the inducement. Officials of the Office of the UNHCR were unhappy
about the arrangement, but Waldheim justified it as the only reasonable choice, saying:
"We are in a dilemma." Id. at 1, col. 6.
165. To spread the burden, third-party states must be willing to give secondary tem-
porary asylum to refugees not wanted by the states of primary asylum; otherwise the
primary asylum states will send the refugees back to where they came from. In the long
run, self-interest favors the establishment of such a practice lest those states refusing aid
today find themselves tomorrow with a similar mass of refugees and no way to disperse
them.
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ment of refugees. 1" Given the moral force behind international
human rights law, other exceptions will follow, and ultimately
those exceptions will swallow the old rules. Better sooner than
later. Even if all the Boat People find new homes,167 history
shows that other cycles of refugees will arise to maintain the
numbers of the world's dispossessed. The longer the delay in
realizing Weis's rule, the more pain and frustration await those
refugees of the future.*
Brian Roberts
166. Standardizing the meaning of "entry" might appear to take away states' free-
dom to define it for themselves and thus conflict with the United Nations Charter provi-
sion that "(n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
State . . . ." U.N. CHAR m, art. 2, § 7. It would leave states free, however, to define
entry internally in any way they wish; the change would be in the external effect of such
definition. An analogous situation was the Nottebohm Case, [1955] I.C.J. 4, where the
ICJ denied the international effect of Liechtenstein's grant of citizenship to Guatemalan
resident Nottebohm. See note 153 supra. The decision had no effect, however, on Not-
tebohm's status within Liechtenstein; he could still live there as a citizen if that state
allowed him to. [1955] I.C.J. at 20. Similarly, a standardization of legal entry would not
constrain states within their borders but would operate precisely when most needed: as
soon as a state attempted to give external effect to its determination by expelling asylees
across an international boundary. If such expulsion were pursuant to a definition of legal
entry that violated the international standard, the community of nations would have no
obligation to recognize or enforce it. Thus the office of the UNHCR, if granted standing,
see note 159 supra, might resist removals from camps under its control; or, if expulsions
were by sea, ships of other states might redeposit the refugees on the same shores not-
withstanding the state sovereignty doctrine. See note 5 supra. See also International
Protection of Human Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Orgs. & Move-
ments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 502-03, 555 (1973)
(human rights and peacekeeping provisions of charter balance nonintervention clause).
167. The possibility is remote in view of the general reluctance exhibited by other
nations, the sheer numbers of Boat People, and the history of similar mass disposses-
sions. Cf. Radley, supra note 32 (history of the Palestinian refugees).
* Editor's note: In 1980, with the slackening of immigration and increased commit-
ments from some states of permanent asylum, notably the People's Republic of China,
Australia, and France, the population of Boat People in the Southeast Asian camps fell
considerably. Indo-Chinese refugees: 400,000 persons resettled since 1975, UNHCR,
April-May 1980, at 11 (UNHCR is the title of the official periodical of the Office of the
UNHCR); Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, UNHCR,
Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 6; Safe Ashore at Last, Tin, Jan. 19, 1981, at 45. Such resettlement,
however, does not proceed from any new developments in international law. The Manila
Declaration on the International Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Asia,
adopted by a Round Table of Asian refugee experts convened by the UNHCR in April
1980, UNHCR, Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 6, is a step forward in regional consideration of the
asylum problem but is still far from having legal effect. Meanwhile, political develop-
ments elsewhere in the world have resulted in refugee populations of unmanageable pro-
portions. Sudan, one of the world's poorest nations, is trying to cope with 400,000 refu-
gees from Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and Chad. Sudan A land of asylum for 400,000
refugees, UNHCR, April-May 1980, at 7. Somalia, with more than 600,000 Ethiopians,
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and Pakistan, with a similar number of Afghans, probably have the most serious interna-
tional refugee problems at this time. Somalia: one out of every five inhabitants is a
refugee, id., at 8.
